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Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof

Crossref DOI link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.001

Published Print: 2018-09

Update policy: https://doi.org/10.1016/elsevier_cm_policy

Authors

Ashlagi, Itai

Gonczarowski, Yannai A.
Funding

Funding for this research was provided by:

European Research Council

Engineering Research Centers (249159)

National Science Foundation (SES-1254768)

Bonfils-Stanton Foundation (2014389)

Seventh Framework Programme

Israel Science Foundation (1435/14)

Seventh Framework Programme

Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities
License Information

Text and Data Mining valid from 2018-09-01

Text and Data Mining valid from 2018-09-01

Accepted Manuscript valid from 2019-07-17
More Information

This article is maintained by: Elsevier

Article Title: Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof

Journal Title: Journal of Economic Theory

CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.001

Content Type: article

Copyright: © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.