Can the Threat of Economic Sanctions Ensure the Sustainability of International Fisheries? An Experiment of a Dynamic Non-cooperative CPR Game with Uncertain Tipping Point
Crossref DOI link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-020-00419-y
Published Online: 2020-04-03
Published Print: 2020-05
Update policy: https://doi.org/10.1007/springer_crossmark_policy
Jules, Selles https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8787-7547
Sylvain, Bonhommeau
Patrice, Guillotreau
Thomas, Vallée
Funding for this research was provided by:
ifremer
Text and Data Mining valid from 2020-04-03
Version of Record valid from 2020-04-03
Article History
Accepted: 26 March 2020
First Online: 3 April 2020