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An IPD-based incentive mechanism to eliminate change orders in construction projects in China

Crossref DOI link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12205-017-0957-3

Published Print: 2017-11

Update policy: https://doi.org/10.1016/elsevier_cm_policy

Authors

Ma, Jiankun

Ma, Zhiliang

Li, Jiulin
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Text and Data Mining valid from 2017-11-01

Text and Data Mining valid from 2017-11-01

Version of Record valid from 2024-08-20
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This article is maintained by: Elsevier

Article Title: An IPD-based incentive mechanism to eliminate change orders in construction projects in China

Journal Title: KSCE Journal of Civil Engineering

CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12205-017-0957-3

Content Type: article

Copyright: Copyright © 2017 © Korean Society of Civil Engineers and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2017 published by Elsevier inc. Published by Elsevier Inc.