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Nash Equilibria in Bounded-Control Symmetrical Scalar Infinite-Horizon Linear Quadratic Differential Games

Crossref DOI link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00681-z

Published Online: 2025-10-24

Published Print: 2026-03

Update policy: https://doi.org/10.1007/springer_crossmark_policy

Authors

Bernhard, Pierre https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3895-4152
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Text and Data Mining valid from 2025-10-24

Version of Record valid from 2025-10-24
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Article History

Received: 23 February 2025

Accepted: 23 September 2025

First Online: 24 October 2025

Declarations

:

: The authors declare no conflict of interest.